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The Local Government Ordinance (LGO), formulated by the National 
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in 2000 and promulgated by provincial governments 
in August 2001, assigns powers, responsibilities, and service delivery functions to 
three levels of local governments: district, tehsil, and union. Responsibilities for the 
delivery of social and human development services, such as primary and basic 
health, education and social welfare, are delegated to the district level, whereas 
municipal services, such as water, sanitation and urban services are assigned to the 
tehsil level. The LGO does not only deal with the delivery of public services in its 
plan but also stresses the need for fiscal decentralisation, claiming that “Fiscal 
decentralisation is the heart of any devolution exercise. Without fiscal 
decentralisation no authority is devolved.”  
Five years into its implementation the debate on the successes or failures 
of the LGO is getting more polarised than ever. There are question regarding: the 
design and sustainability of the reforms; fears of a bureaucratic claw back and 
re-centralisation; actual decentralisation as against a conceived one; and issues 
related to vertical programmes and overlapping of jurisdictions. There are also 
questions related to the system achieving the objectives that any devolution plan 
intends to achieve, including: a more efficient provision and delivery of public 
services; improved spatial efficiency in planning and expenditure; greater 
responsiveness to local preferences; and more transparent accountability in 
policymaking.  
Themes emerging from the day long deliberations on decentralisation in 
Pakistan can be classified in four categories:  political; administrative; spatial; and 
market, having six interlinked dimensions to governance assessment. These 
dimensions include:  (i) conceptual; (ii) empirical; (iii) community action and social 
mobilisation; (iv) capacity building; (v) policy inputs; and (vi) research.  
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Theme I:  The Structure and Conceptual Definition of Decentralisation 
There are several questions that beg answers regarding the structure of the 
devolution reforms. Some of these are:  
 (i) There is a need to conceptualise decentralisation in Pakistan to understand 
what does it actually mean in the country? Do the devolution reforms 
envisage just decentralisation of functions or does it entail devolution of 
power as well? There is thus a need to expand, explain and explore terms 
like devolution and decentralisation to understand what they stand for in 
Pakistan in reality and what an idealised model can look like.  
 (ii) What is the unit of decentralisation, and thus the unit of analysis?  
 (iii) How are the sub-nationals linked with the national and the power relations 
between different tiers of government? What are the linkages between the 
national, provincial and local governments, and what are the anomalies in 
it?  
 (iv) How many of the existing national and sub-national structures can be 
deemed consistent with devolution? 
 (v) Should devolution reforms have a uniform design to be implemented 
across the country, be it a city or a village, or have provision for 
heterogeneous designs for different regions/areas?  
 
Theme II: Free Markets and Decentralisation  
The form of decentralisation that interests economists the most is market 
decentralisation, with many considering free markets quintessential for 
decentralisation. Market decentralisation is generally used by economists to analyse 
and endorse actions that promote the creation of an environment that allows goods 
and services to be produced and provided by market mechanisms sensitive to the 
preferences of individuals. Recent trends of economic liberalisation and privatisation 
have further strengthened the idea of market decentralisation. For real 
decentralisation to take place there is a need to deregulate markets in both rural and 
urban areas. In this scenario there is a need to explore: 
 (i) What should be the role of the state in the devolution process in Pakistan, 
and procedures required to deregulate markets in both rural and urban 
areas? 
 (ii) What kind of administrative reforms are needed to have free markets in 
the country? 
 
Theme III: Resource Control and Decentralisation  
The relation between decentralisation and resource control, including tax and 
revenue assignments, is key to fiscal decentralisation, which in turn is the 
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cornerstone of any genuine devolution effort. It involves issues like, who pays for 
what and how much, who provides what, who delivers and, most importantly, who 
takes all these decisions. There is a need for a clear cut resource mandate at every 
level of government to avoid any confusion. However, that is not the case in 
Pakistan. There are frequent overlappings, mainly because different jurisdictional 
tiers are trying to perform the same function. Likewise, there are inadequacies in tax 
and revenue mandates. Administrative responsibility to collect various sub-national 
taxes has been assigned to one level of government or another. However, it is 
common that provincial governments and local governments share the tax revenues 
that are collected, or one level of sub-national government might collect a tax on 
behalf of another level of government. This arrangement has the potential to 
perverse incentives, where one level of sub-national government depends for its 
resources on the fiscal capacity of another level of government to levy and collect 
taxes. In the devolution reforms of Pakistan the link between local taxpayer cost and 
local service delivery clearly is lacking, while evidence shows that people are ready 
to pay taxes if they know the collected amount would be spent for their betterment. 
This inconsistency is due to restrictions on the legal right of local governments to 
impose taxes or fees. A more efficient fiscal decentralisation would require reforms 
to expand the types of taxes that local governments can impose and providing them 
with more autonomy to set tax rates. In certain cases however, local governments 
can misuse their power to collect revenues stressing the need for a more transparent 
and accountable system. 
 
Theme IV: Developing a Scoring System for Decentralisation  
There is a need to develop a scoring system that could be used to evaluate and 
rate the performance of local governments. This requires a selection of indicators 
and devising a system to gather information regarding these indicators at the local 
government level. Such an exercise can also help garner a sense of competition 
among different districts to get better ratings, and consequently enhancing their 
performance.  
  
Theme V:  The Role of Donors and Devolution in Pakistan 
Pakistan’s devolution plan has the support of many international donors, who 
at times are held responsible for certain ills as well, including vertical programmes. 
Vertical programmes defy the whole logic behind decentralisation, however, it is a 
common occurrence in Pakistan. For instance, roads and transport are being dealt 
with by all tiers of government, that is the federal, provincial, district and tehsil 
governments. Same is the case with water and sanitation. This lack of clarity of 
responsibilities and functions undermines the whole process of devolution and 
fragments the incentive structure. It is claimed that it is the donors who give funds 
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for similar kind of projects at different levels of government, which generally leads 
to bypassing of the lowest tier. In their defence, donors maintain that projects are 
identified by the respective governments and they only fund it and they do not have 
any role in deciding the nature of the project.  
 
Theme VI: Evaluating Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) 
How important is notion of participation to devolution? According to the 
LGO, community is expected to contribute in planning and execution of the 
development projects and have ownership of development. In the Plan, community 
participation has been ensured through village/neighbourhood councils and Citizen 
Community Boards (CCBs). However, certain apprehensions exist regarding elite 
capture, leading to factionalism, at the local level. There is a need for countervailing 
centres of power. This can be done by forming autonomous organisation of the poor. 
Experience tells that poor are ready to organise, despite the presence of an elite 
class, if there is an incentive to get organised. They can get organised, gain skills, 
get credit and initiate a localised process of capital accumulation. Group formation is 
a dynamic process, and sense of consciousness emerges as more collective ventures 
are carried out. Even in cases where poor belong to different baradaris  given an 
opportunity of economic growth new identities transcend old ones—multiple 
identities can coexist. This is the logic that was behind the conception of CCBs. 
However, there are certain problems in realisation of this concept. All communities 
are not alike, as they are a product of their respective patterns of socio-economic 
differences, history of factionalism, and a horizontal based ideological history. 
Different areas receive different shocks, setting different communities on different 
trajectories. There is a need for a typology for CCBs, explaining which CCBs 
perform well and which do not. There is also a need to evaluate the strength of CCB 
not only as a self-sustaining body—that is being more than a project driven 
organisation and going beyond the support of donors, but also as a  trigger for social 
mobilisation.  
 
Theme VII: Capacity at the Local Level 
An evaluation of urban government budgets suggests that these governments 
in fact have quite vast revenue sources and have much more revenue generating 
opportunities than they actually implement. This raises questions regarding the 
capacity of the local government personnel to implement the LGO and run the 
system. It includes not just the human and managerial capacity but also political 
capacity to run the system efficiently. Skills required, like those required for budget 
making, may be absent at the local tiers of government. Along with political 
capacity political maturity is also a much wanted trait needed to make any 
devolution plan work. Institutional analysis of local governments can help us gauge 
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the level of capacity available at the lowest tier to carry out the functions as 
envisaged by the LGO.  
Other issues related to devolution reforms in Pakistan deliberated upon during 
the meet included: demand for devolution at the grassroots level; national goals and 
local governments; issues of equity, transparency and accountability; corruption; 
lack of regulation regarding hazardous activities; need for standard operating 
procedures at all tiers of government; and sustainability of local governments.  
Participants included Dr Akmal Hussain, Dr Ali Cheema, Mr Shahid Hafiz 
Kardar, Mr Ijaz Haider, Mr Qaim Shah, Dr Sohail Malik, Mr Harris Gazdar, and Dr 
Nadeem Ul Haque. 
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